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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Kingdom of Arkam and the State of Randolfia have submitted, by
Special Agreement, their differences concerning the Rome Statute, and
transmitted a copy thereof to the Registrar of the Court pursuant to Article 40(1)
of the Statute. Therefore, both parties have accepted the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) pursuant to Article 36(1) of the Statute of
the Court.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1918, the monarch of the Duchy of Lengians and Arkamians abdicated,
resulting in the creation of three new states: Randolfia (Respondent); the
Kingdom of Arkam (Applicant); and the Kingdom of Leng. All are developing
states, each with a population of approximately one million. All states share
common borders. The populations of Arkam and Leng are made up of two
ethnic groups: Arkamians and Lengians. In Arkam, Arkamians constitute
nearly ninety percent of the population, while in Leng, Lengians constitute
slightly more than ninety percent. There have not been a significant number of
intermarriages between members of each ethnic group, and their relationship has
been highlighted by episodes of armed conflict. Randolfia has a multi-ethnic
population, with an equal number of Lengians and Arkamians. Arkam and
Leng are constitutional monarchies, with the thrones and legislative controls
held by the ethnic majorities. Randolfia is a democracy whose parliament has
been peacefully contested by several ethnic-based political parties, and the
Lengian party is currently in power. Randolfia's annual trade with Arkam
constitutes about 40% percent of Randolfia's worldwide commerce.
In January 2003, a trans-border armed conflict erupted between ethnic
Lengians and Arkamians in both Leng and Arkam, for which the United Nations
convened an international peace conference in the Randolfian capital. The
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conflict in Arkam ceased, but no accord was reached over the conflict in Leng.
Under the Peace Agreement signed on March 1, 2003, Arkam established a
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) empowered to grant a full
amnesty for all crimes committed during the armed conflict between the two
ethnic groups. The TRC has been cited as "a shining example of how truth and
reconciliation can bring peace to a troubled region."
In Leng, sporadic small-scale fighting continued in the primarily Arkamian
province of Yuggott. This fighting was spurred by the Greater Arkamian
Liberation Army (GALA), a militia dedicated to the secession of Yuggott from
Leng and its unification with Arkam. On May 1, 2003 the Rome Statute entered
into force for Leng and Randolfia but not for Arkam. Although Randolfia has
enacted domestic legislation implementing the Rome Statute, it lacks domestic
legislation criminalizing genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes
committed by non-Randolfian nationals outside its borders.
Dr. Herbert West is a citizen of Arkam and a professor at a University in
Arkam, whose scholarship is recognized around the world. In April 2003, West
recorded an audiotape in Arkam, urging his Arkamians to achieve Arkam's
unity with Yuggott. West gave the only copy to his neighbor, also a member
of GALA, but nothing evidences that he gave any instructions as to what use,
if any, should be made of it. GALA members duplicated the recording, which
was then played on Radio Yuggott. On May 16th, bands of ethnic Arkamians
began to conduct nighttime raids, attacking ethnic Lengians in several towns in
Yuggott. By the end of May, a percentage of the Lengian population of
Yuggott had been killed. On June 20, 2003, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 2241, which created Multinational Force for Lengian relief created
by Security Council Resolution 2241, (IFLEN) a multinational force, with a
threefold mandate: to enter Yuggott, shut down Radio Yuggott, and put a stop
to the bloodshed. Resolution 2241 read, in part, "officials or personnel of con-
tributing states, not parties to the Rome Statute, shall be subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of that contributing state for all alleged acts or omissions related to
... IFLEN, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that
contributing." The Resolution was adopted with ten votes in favor, and five
abstentions.
Lieutenant Joseph Curwen, a citizen and resident of Arkam, led one of
IFLEN's platoons. On June 28, 2003, GALA attacked Curwen's platoon,
killing twelve soldiers and injuring four others. As a response, Curwen ordered
his platoon to attack Exhamtown, a village which was a GALA stronghold. On
June 29, 2003, the platoon killed a number of ethnic Lengians and ethnic
Arkamians. On June 30th, GALA and the Lengian government agreed to a
United Nations-monitored cease-fire, which continues to this day. IFLEN
dismissed Curwen, and Arkam ordered him to return home. On July 3rd, the
Royal Arkamian Army (RAA) Commander in Chief (CIC) ordered him to
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resign, and to appear before the TRC within thirty days. Between July 20th and
22nd, Curwen and West, while in Randolfia for different reasons, were arrested
for minor offences. On July 23rd, Randolfia's press urged the government of
Randolfia to send these individuals to the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Eliza Tillinghast, the Randolfian Minister of Justice, dispatched a communique
on July 25, 2003, informing the ICC's Registrar about Randolfia's holding in
custody of West and Curwen and requesting the Rome Statute to take
jurisdiction over these two men.
On July 26, 2003, the King of Arkam sent a diplomatic note to the Presi-
dent of Randolfia, indicating that Arkam would not appear before the ICC to
challenge admissibility in light of its well-publicized characterization of the ICC
as an illegal court. On July 29th, the Prosecutor of the ICC sent written notifi-
cations to Arkam, Leng and Randolfia, establishing that there was a reasonable
basis to commence investigations pursuant to the allegations contained in
Tillinghast's communiqud. In August 2003, the ICC's Prosecutor carried out
investigations and two Pre-Trial Chambers were constituted. On September 1,
2003, the ICC's Prosecutor charged West with incitement to genocide and
attempted genocide. Curwen was charged with war crimes and acts of violence
in Leng. The Pre-Trial Chambers issued arrest warrants for both individuals.
On the same day the arrest warrants were issued, the King of Arkam sent a
diplomatic note to Randolfia's President, indicating the possible adoption of
economic restrictions toward Randolfia in response to such Government's
decision to attempt the surrender of both Arkamian nationals to the ICC. As a
consequence, the two states entered into negotiations, agreeing to submit their
dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Leng declined to intervene
in this case.
III. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
A. It is illegal under international law for Randolfia to surrender Curwen to
the ICC pursuant to the warrant for his arrest.
Arkam has not waived its jurisdiction to try Curwen, as is expressly
required under Security Council Resolution 2241. Indeed, Security Council
Resolution 2241, adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (UN
Charter) for the purpose of maintaining peace and security in Leng, was adopted
in accordance with international law, as it complied with Security Council
voting procedures and was a perfectly justified measure in light of the wide
powers conferred upon the Security Council under the UN Charter, and as
evidenced from past practice of such United Nations body in similar situations.
In any case, the ICJ itself has recognized that it does not have the power of
judicial review over Security Council decisions. Hence, Randolfia must comply
with Security Council Resolution 2241 and must therefore abstain from
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surrendering Curwen to the ICC, as it would otherwise be acting contrary to its
international obligations under the UN Charter, which must prevail over all
other obligations it may have, including obligations under the Rome Statute
Statute.
B. The exercise ofjurisdiction by the Rome Statute over Curwen is in breach
ofArticle 34 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT).
Indeed, Arkam, Curwen's nationality, is not a party to the Rome Statute.
Article 34 provides that treaties cannot modify existing rights of third party
states. In this case, the Rome Statute is modifying Arkam's right to exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over its nationals. In addition, there is no customary rule
of international law which allows the delegation of criminal jurisdiction by
states to international tribunals. Thus Randolfia may not argue that Article 12
of the Rome Statute codifies customary international law. Should Article 12 of
the Rome Statute be deemed customary, Arkam is a persistent objector to said
rule.
C. Given the ongoing investigation by the Arkamian TRC into the acts of Mr.
Curwen, the exercise ofjurisdiction over him by the ICC would violate the
principle of complementarity, since Arkam has exclusive jurisdiction over
Curwen, and it is carrying out a genuine investigation through a TRC.
This cannot be mistaken for unwillingness to investigate or prosecute,
since TRCs have been supported by the United Nations as valid alternative
forms of justice. Moreover, the granting of amnesty by the TRC should not be
regarded as unwillingness because international law today does not support a
general duty to prosecute international crimes. Finally, the amnesty does not
shield Curwen from punishment, which has been delivered by ordering him to
resign his commission without benefits.
D. It is illegal under international law for Randolfia to surrender Herbert
West to the ICC pursuant to the warrant for his arrest.
Neither West nor his allegedly criminal conduct demonstrates the
necessary nexus with a state party to the Rome Statute. Indeed, West's alleged
crime was committed in Arkam. Since all of his actions took place in said state,
the result theory and the continued crime doctrine do not apply. Furthermore,
West's alleged complicity was perpetrated in Arkam. West's actions preceded
the date that the Rome Statute entered into force with respect to Leng and
Randolfia, and are thus barred from the ICC's consideration, as established
under the doctrine of Intertemporal Law and by the Rome Statute.
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West's alleged acts do not constitute a crime of the competence of the ICC.
Indeed, the evidence does not support a primafacie case of West's guilt, since
the physical and mental elements of the crime of incitement to genocide are not
fulfilled. Furthermore, West cannot be held responsible under the doctrine of
superior responsibility, nor as an accomplice. Additionally, there is no causal
link between West's acts and the actual commission of the crime. Finally, West
is not responsible for genocide or attempted genocide under the Nahimana
decision.
IV. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether it would be illegal under international law for Randolfia to
surrender Joseph Curwen to the ICC pursuant to the warrant for his arrest given
that.
a) Arkam has not waived its exclusive jurisdiction to try Joseph Curwen,
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2241;
b) The exercise of the jurisdiction of the ICC over a national of a state,
not a party to the Rome Statute, violates the VCLT and Customary
International Law; and,
c) Given the ongoing investigation by the Arkamian TRC into the acts
of Mr. Curwen described in the indictment, the exercise of jurisdic-
tion over him by the ICC would violate the principle of comple-
mentarity.
2. Whether it would be illegal under international law for Randolfia to
surrender Herbert West to the ICC pursuant to the warrant for his arrest given
that
a) Neither Mr. West nor his allegedly criminal conduct demonstrates the
necessary nexus with a state Party to the Rome Statute;
b) Mr. West's actions preceded the date upon which the Rome Statute
entered into force with respect to Leng and Randolfia, and are thus
barred from the ICC's consideration; and,
c) Mr. West's alleged conduct does not constitute a crime within the
competence of the ICC.
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V. PLEADINGS
A. It Would Be Illegal Under International Law for Randolfia to Surrender
Joseph Curwen to the ICC Pursuant To the Warrant for His Arrest.
1. Arkam Has Not Waived Its Exclusive Jurisdiction To Try Joseph Curwen,
Pursuant To Resolution 2241 And Therefore The ICC Is Without Jurisdiction
To Try Him.
In June 2003, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2241, Operative
Paragraph 7, which provides that states contributing with IFLEN that are non-
parties to the Rome Statute enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over their agents, unless
expressly waived. Arkam, a contributing state non-party to the Rome Statute,
has not waived its exclusive jurisdiction over Curwen, hence he may not be tried
by the ICC.
a. Resolution 2241 is in Accordance with and Justifiable
under International Law.
In the United Nations system, each organ is empowered to define its own
competence.' However, the UN Charter confers upon United Nations organs
the powers required to duly discharge their functions,2 including those which,
though not expressly provided, are conferred by necessary implication as being
essential to the performance of their duties.3 This holds true for the Security
Council,4 which has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security.5 In discharging this crucial duty, the Security Council
enjoys a wide margin of discretion,6 as it is empowered to take whatever
1. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2 of the Charter) (Expenses
Case), 1962 I.C.J. 151, 168 (July 20); Concerning the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970) (Namibia Case), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 170 (June 21) (separate opinion of Judge De Castro).
2. Reparation for Injuries Suffered In The Service of The United Nations (Reparations Case), 1949
I.C.J. 174, 322 (Apr. 11).
3. Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1954
I.C.J. 47, 57 (July 13); Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1996 I.C.J. 66,
79 (July 8); Reparations Case, 1949 I.C.J at 322-23.
4. See generally Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 16.
5. U.N. CHARTER, art 24, para. 1.
6. Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the Montreal Convention Arising Out
of the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Lockerbie Case) (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114, 170 (Apr. 14)
(dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry); DAVID SCHWEIGMAN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER 190 (2001); Matthias J. Herdegen, The
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measures it deems necessary to fulfill its responsibility.7 In that context, its
actions enjoy a presumption of legality, as recognized by this Court. In
adopting Resolution 2241, the Security Council acted explicitly under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter, hence it enjoyed the most ample discretion to decide
which measures were necessary in order to maintain peace and security.
Moreover, on previous occasions, United States pressure has led the
Security Council to include provisions similar to Operative Paragraph 7 in its
Resolutions in order to safeguard the continuity of United Nations missions.9
Such was the case of Resolution 1422, where the extension of the United
Nations mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina was threatened by a United States
veto, unless United Nations peacekeepers who were nationals of contributing
non-party states were exempted from ICC jurisdiction.'I Under such circum-
stances, Security Council members acceded to adopt the provision in order to
guarantee extension of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
mandate." Similarly, the United States successfully exercised this kind of
pressure in the Liberia affair.' 2 After twelve votes in favor and three
abstentions, France -who disagreed with Operative Paragraph 7- did not veto the
resolution, recognizing as did others, the urgent need to authorize deployment
of troops.'3  In the present case, the insistence of one permanent Security
Council member led it to include Operative Paragraph 7 in Resolution 2241 as
a necessary condition to authorize IFLEN operations in Yuggott. Hence the
adoption of Security Council Resolution 2241 is one more instance where states
Constitutionalization of the UN Security System, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 135, 152 (1994); Bryan
McPherson, Authority of the Security Council to Exempt Peacekeepers from International Criminal Court
Proceedings (July 2002), ASIL INSIGHTS, http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh89.htm.
7. See generally Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 16; Libya v. U.S., 1992 I.C.J. at 179; See Jost
Delbrflck, Article 24, in I THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, A COMMENTARY 403 (Bruno Simma ed.,
2d ed. 2002); SCHWEIGMAN, supra note 6, at 301.
8. Expenses Case, 1962 I.C.J. at 168.
9. S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4572nd mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/1422 (2002); S.C. Res.
1487, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4772nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1487 (2003); See generally U.N. SCOR, 58th
Sess., 4803rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1497 (2003).
10. UN fights to save Bosnia Mission, BBC NEWS, July 1, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas; Edith M. Lederer, U.S. May Veto Bosnia Peace Mission,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 28, 2002, http://www.balkanpeace.org/hed/archive/june02/hed5055.html; Ewen
MacAskill & Richard Norton-Taylor, US Threat to Balkans Peace Force, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, June 27,
2002, http://guardian.co.uk/interational.
11. U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4573rd mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. SiPV.4573 (2003); S.C. Res. 1487, U.N.
SCOR, 58th Sess., 4772nd mtg. 1 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1487 (2003).
12. Press Release, SC/7836, United Nations, Security Council Authorizes Multinational Force to
Support Ceasefire in Liberia (2003), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7836.doc.htm; See generally
U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4803rd mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1497 (2003).
13. U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4803rd ntg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4803 (2003).
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have confirmed the necessity of investing the Security Council with the power
to exclude certain agents from ICC jurisdiction.
Finally, to be deemed valid, Security Council resolutions must observe
Security Council rules of voting procedure. Voting procedures require resolu-
tions to be in accordance with the UN Charter. 4 This requires its adoption by
nine affirmative votes, including the concurring votes of permanent members.15
In this case, Resolution 2241 was approved with ten affirmative votes and five
abstentions. Further, the Security Council was validly exercising its wide
discretional powers under Chapter VII to maintain international peace and
security. Moreover, although not always necessary, 6 a possible third requisite,
as argued among scholars, consists in the prior determination of the existence
of a threat to the peace when the Security Council acts under Chapter VII.'7 In
this case, though the text of Resolution 2241 is not available, such determination
is inferable, since: no one contested the Resolution's validity, which has been
done before when such determination was omitted; 18 Yuggott's situation was a
threat to peace, since neither civil war nor internal strife are considered as
such; 9 and, the Security Council acted explicitly under Chapter VII, which
sufficiently implies such a threat. 20 Hence, Security Council Resolution 2241
was validly adopted.
14. U.N. CHARTER, art. 27, para. 3.
15. See generally Namibia Case, 1971 L C.J. at 16.
16. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 298 1st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991); S.C. Res.
724, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3023rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/724 (1991); S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 47th
Sess., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/771 (1992); S.C. Res. 819, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3199th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/819 (1993); S.C. Res. 820, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3200th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/820 (1993);
S.C. Res. 824, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3208th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/824 (1993); S.C. Res. 833, U.N. SCOR,
48th Sess., 3224th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/833 (1993); S.C. Res. 834, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3226th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/834 (1993).
17. BENEDETTO CONFORTI, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 173-74 (2000);
SYDNEY D. BAILEY & SAM DAWS, THE PROCEDURE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 271 (3d ed. 1998);
FreudenschuB, Article 39 of the UN Charter Revisited: Threats to the Peace and the Recent Practice of the
UN Security Council, 46 Aus. J. PUB. INT'L L. (page), 31 (1993); See Jochen Abr. Frowein & Wico Krisch,
Article 39, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, A COMMENTARY 613 (2002).
18. U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4568th mtg. at 7-9, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4568 (2002); U.N. SCOR, 58th
Sess., 4772nd mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4772 (2003).
19. S.C. Res. 161, U.N. SCOR, 16th Sess., 933rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/4741 (1961); S.C. Res. 688,
U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/0688 (1991); S.C. Res. 733, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
3039th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/733 (1992); S.C. Res. 751, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3069th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/751 (1992); See generally S.C. Res. 1497, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4803rd mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1497 (2003).
20. CONFORTI, supra note 17, at 173.
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b. Alternatively, Resolution 2241 is not Subject to Judicial Review.
The Security Council has ample powers to determine the existence of
threats to peace,21 and such determination cannot be questioned.22 Indeed, no
procedures exist for determining the validity of acts of United Nations organs.23
Moreover, this Court has recognized the inherent limitations to its judicial
function,24 and that it lacks the power of judicial review of Security Council
decisions. In fact, neither the UN Charter nor the ICJ Statute nor their travaux
preparatoires indicate that such power was to be attributed to the Court.26 Even
those who argue that such power exists, limit its application to pronouncements
on the validity of Security Council determinations of legal responsibility.27 This
is not the case here. Hence, Resolution 2241 is not subject to judicial review.
c. Randolfa is Bound to Comply with Resolution 2241.
To ensure the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security
Council enjoys a binding decision-making power,28 evidenced by a specific
provision imposing on United Nations members the obligation to accept and
carry out Security Council decisions.29 The binding nature of Security Council
resolutions depends on the wording and the UN Charter provisions invoked.3 °
In Resolution 2241, the Security Council acted explicitly under Chapter VII,
and imperative language, such as the word decides, was used. Hence, Resolu-
tion 2241 is binding upon Randolfia under Article 25 of the UN Charter. More-
over, states must comply with treaty obligations in good faith,31 including their
21. Prosecutor v. Tadic, 1995 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-94- I-A 154 (Oct. 2); Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, 1997
I.C.T.R. No. ICTR-96-15-T 20; Libya v. U.S., 1992 I.C.J. at 176; Id. at 9 (dissenting opinion of Judge
Jennings); Susan Lamb, Legal Limits to United Nations Security Council Powers, in THE REALITY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF IAN BROWNLIE 375 (Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Stefan Talmon
eds., 1999).
22. Libyav. U.S., 1992 I.C.J. at 171; Michael Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law
219 (Routledge, 6th ed. 1992) (1970); Conforti, supra note 17, at 173-74; Frowein, supra note 17, at 610.
23. Expenses Case, 1962 I.C.J. at 168; Libya v. U.S., 1992 I.C.J. at 176.
24. Concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K.), 1963 I.C.J. 15, 30 (Dec. 2).
25. See generally Namibia Case, 1971 1.C.J. at 16.
26. UN Doc. 664, IV/2/33, 13 UNCIO Docs. 633, 1945; Lamb, supra note 21, at 363; Vera
Gowland-Debbas, The Relationship Between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council in
Light of the Lockerbie Case, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 643, 664 (1994)
27. Derek Bowett, The Impact of Security Council Decisions and Dispute Settlement Procedures,
5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 89, 94 (1994).
28. See generally Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 16; SCHWEIGMAN, supra note 6, at 49; See Delbrilck,
supra note 7, at 413.
29. U.N. CHARTER, art. 25.
30. See generally Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 114.
31. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 26, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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obligations under the Charter,3 2 including compliance with Security Council
decisions directly and through their action in international agencies,3 3 including
United Nations specialized agencies and other international organizations,34
such as the ICC. Curwen's surrender to the ICC would subject him to a
jurisdiction other than Arkam's, which is contrary to Resolution 2241. Hence,
by executing the ICC arrest warrant, Randolfia would breach its obligation
under the Charter to accept and carry out Resolution 2241.
Finally, Randolfia may argue that its obligation under the Rome Statute to
surrender Curwen collides with Resolution 2241. However, in the event of
conflict, obligations under the Charter prevail over those assumed by virtue of
other agreements.35 Indeed, measures deriving from binding Security Council
decisions give rise to obligations that members must fulfill irrespective of any
other commitments.36 Thus, obligations deriving from Resolution 2241 prevail
over any other obligation binding upon Randolfia, including its obligation to
surrender Curwen to the ICC.
d. Arkam has Exclusive Jurisdiction over Curwen, Which it has not
Expressly Waived.
Under Resolution 2241, Arkam has exclusive jurisdiction over its IFLEN
agents, unless expressly waived. This entails that Arkam would have to make
a clear and unambiguous statement to that effect, and no inference of action
would establish an implicit waiver. The Compromis shows no evidence of such
waiver by Arkam; rather, it has asserted jurisdiction over Curwen by taking
disciplinary measures and serving upon him a subpoena. Moreover, the
granting of amnesty by the TRC does not represent an implicit waiver, since
TRCs are recognized as legitimate exercises of jurisdiction, constituting an
alternative form of justice.37 Hence, in the absence of an express waiver by
Arkam, Randolfia may not surrender Curwen to the ICC.
32. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 2; See Jorg P. Miller & Robert Kolb, Article 2(2), in I THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, A COMMENTARY 91 (2002).
33. U.N. CHARTER, art. 48, para. 2.
34. See Brun-Otto Bryde & August Reinisch, Article 48, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, A COMMENTARY 775 (2002).
35. U.N. CHARTER, art. 103; Vienna Convention, supra note 31, art. 30(1).
36. Libya v. U.S., 1992 I.C.J. at 126; See Rudolf Bernhardt, Article 103, in 2 THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, A COMMENTARY 1292 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002); Thomas M. Franck, The Powers
of Appreciation: Who is the Ultimate Guardian of the UN Legality?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 519, 521 (1992).
37. Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement
International Criminal Law, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 869, 870 (2002); Theresa Klosterman, The Feasibility and
Propriety of a Truth Commission in Cambodia: Too Little? Too Late?, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 833, 840
(1998); Jennifer J. Llewellyn, A Comment on the Complementarity Jurisdiction of the Court: Adding Insult
to Injury in Transitional Contexts, 24 DALHOUSIE L.J. 192, 194 (2001).
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2. The Exercise of Jurisdiction by the ICC over a National of a State not
Party to the Rome Statute Violates the VCLT and Customary
International Law.
Under Article 12 of its Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction over crimes:
committed in the territory of a state party, regardless of the nationality of the
offender; or committed by a national of a state party. In this case, Randolfia
intends to surrender Curwen, an Arkamian, to the jurisdiction of the ICC for
crimes committed in Leng, a party to the Rome Statute. However, this exercise
of ICC jurisdiction would breach international law, as proven below.
a. The Exercise of Jurisdiction over Curwen Would Breach
Article 34 of the VCLT.
Under Article 34 of the VCLT, ratified by both parties to the present case,
treaties cannot create obligations or rights for third non-party states.38 This rule
is considered a codification of customary law,39 and has been acknowledged by
this court and its predecessor.40  The ILC and international tribunals have
interpreted this rule to mean that treaties cannot modify legal rights of states not
parties to them.4' One of such customary rights of states that derives from state
sovereignty is the right to exercise jurisdiction over nationals.42 This implies
that states must expressly consent to their nationals being tried by other
jurisdictions either by ratifying a treaty creating such jurisdiction or by giving
ad hoc consent. Accordingly, the exercise of ICC jurisdiction over nationals of
third parties, such as Curwen, abrogates pre-existing rights of such states, and
thus breaches Article 34 of the VCLT.43
38. Vienna Convention, supra note 31, art. 34.
39. ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 11 (2000); MALCOLM N. SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 561 (3d ed. 1995) (1991); OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 69 (1991); ANToNIo CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 126 (2001).
40. Columbian-Peruvian Asylum (Colom. v. Per6i), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 273-76 (Nov. 20); Free Zones
of Upper Savoy and the District ofGex (Fr. v. Swed.), 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 28, at 96 (June 7); Status
of Eastern Carelia, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 6, at 27 (July 23) (Advisory Opinion); Territorial Jurisdiction
of the River Oder Commission, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 29, at 19 (Sept. 10); Concerning the Aerial Incident
of July 27 1955 (U.S. v. Bulg.), 1959 I.C.J. 270 (Sept. 9).
41. 2 Sm ARTHUR WATTS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 1949-1998 698 (1999); Island
of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 831, Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott) 83 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
42. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 456 § 136 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts, eds.,
9th ed. 1996); REBECCA WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW Ill (3d ed. 1997); SHAW, supra note 39, at 403.
43. A. Diane Holcombe, Comment: The United States Becomes a Signatory to the Rome Treaty
Establishing the International Criminal Court: Why are so any Concerned by this Action?, 61 MONT. L. REV.
301, 314 (2001); Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, 64 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 26-27 (2001); Damir Arnaut, When in Rome... ? The International Criminal Court
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b. The Exercise of Jurisdiction over Curwen Cannot be
Accepted under Custom.
The provisions of a treaty that has not been ratified by a state will only
bind it through international custom." In order to justify ICC jurisdiction,
Randolfia will argue that Article 12 of the Rome Statute codifies customary law,
based on the theories of delegated universal jurisdiction or delegated territorial
jurisdiction.45 However, no customary rule binds states to delegate their
criminal jurisdiction to international tribunals.
Randolfia may argue that the exercise ofjurisdiction over nationals of non-
parties is based on the theory that the signatory states have delegated their
customary right to exercise universal jurisdiction over the crimes prescribed in
the Rome Statute.46 However, this argument is not accepted under international
law for three reasons. First, Article 12 of the Statute was not drafted with the
intention of establishing universal jurisdiction.4" In fact, Germany's universal
jurisdiction proposal was expressly rejected by the majority of states, e.g.,
Colombia, Indonesia, India, Russia, France, Brazil, Uruguay, Sweden, Norway,
Israel, Iraq, Iran, Qatar. Secondly, no precedent under international law
supports the delegation of universal jurisdiction by treaty.48 Indeed, delegation
of jurisdiction on previous international tribunals was based on states' consent,
i.e. Germany and Japan consented to the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals,49 and
the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) and International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) were created by Security
and Venues of U.S. Participation, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 525, 550 (2003).
44. CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (1993); REUTER,
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TREATIES 140 (Kegan Paul International 1995); CASSESE, supra note 39, at
119.
45. David Scheffer, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law
(March 26, 1999), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/otherissues/DavidSchefferAddressChICC.doc; Michael
P. Scharf, The United States and the International Criminal Court: The ICC's Jurisdiction over the Nationals
of Non- Party States: A Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 76 (2001).
46. Seth Harris, The United States and the International Criminal Court: Legal Potential for Non-
Party State Jurisdiction, 23 HAWAII L. REV. 277, 302 (2000); Remigius Chibueze, United States Objection
to the International Criminal Court: A Paradox of "Operation Enduring Freedom ", 9 ANN. SURV. INT'L &
COMP. L. 19, 36 (2003); Arnaut, supra note 43, at 552.
47. G. Haffner et al, A Response to the American View as Presented by Ruth Wedgwood, 5 EUR.
J.INT'L L. 108, 116-17 (1999); Nicolaos Strapatsas, Universal Jurisdiction and the International Criminal
Court, 29 MAN. L.J. 1, 30 (2002); Bartram S. Brown, U.S. Objections to the Statute of the International
Criminal Court: A Brief Response, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 855, 874 (1998-1999).
48. Brown, supra note 47, at 874; Morris, supra note 43, at 37; Haffner et al, supra note 47, at 116-
17.
49. Scheffer, supra note 45; Morris, supra note 43, at 37.
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Council resolutions." Finally, some crimes of the Rome Statute are not subject
to universal jurisdiction." Moreover, the exercise of universal jurisdiction is
questionably a customary rule,52 as recognized by most justices of this Court. 3
Randolfia may also argue that state parties to the Rome Statute have
delegated their territorial jurisdiction to the ICC in the same way that a state can
delegate its territorial jurisdiction to another state. However, delegation of
territorial jurisdiction from one state to another is only possible with the consent
of the defendant's national state. 4 Thus, the same should apply to the
delegation of territorial jurisdiction to an international court. Hence, said
argument would be unreasonable in the absence of state practice to that effect.
Any effort to argue the customary status of the ICC's power to exercise
jurisdiction over nationals of non-parties is futile, since state practice is clearly
against it. Indeed, several states have not ratified the Rome Statute precisely for
this reason, and numerous contracting parties at the Rome conference con-
sidered this rule excessive, e.g., India, Russia, France, Libya, Japan, Colombia,
Sudan, Indonesia, Brazil, Sweden and Spain. Accordingly, many contracting
parties have executed treaties with non-parties to the Rome Statute, specifically
the United States, to exclude its jurisdiction over their nationals, e.g., Argentina,
Australia, Belgium, Colombia, Cameroon, Egypt, Georgia, Honduras, Israel,
Ireland, Thailand, Uganda. Furthermore, Security Council resolutions have
excluded ICC jurisdiction over United Nations peacekeeping personnel who are
nationals of non-party states, not only in the case of Yuggott, but also in the
cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Liberia." State practice shows that Article 12
50. See generally S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rdmtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994);
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
51. See generally Statement by Judge Eli Nathan, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of and International Criminal Court 9th Plenary Meeting (July 17,
1998), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/govermnents/IsraelatPrepCom 17July1998.pdf; Morris, supra note
43, at 28; Scheffer, supra note 45.
52. Michael P. Scharf, Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects: Application of
Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction to Nationals of Non-Party States, 35 NEw ENG. L. REV. 227,373 (2001);
Kaul, Preconditions to the Exercise ofJurisdiction, in 1 CASSESE ET AL, THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 587 (Oxford 2002); Mark A. Summers, The International Court Of
Justice's Decision In Congo V Belgium: How Has It Affected The Development Of A Principle Of Universal
Jurisdiction That Would Obligate All States To Prosecute War Criminals?, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 63, 98 (2003);
Regina v. Bartle ex parte Pinochet, 37 I.L.M. 1302, 1305 (1998).
53. Concerning the Arrest Warrant of April 11 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 1, 8 (Feb. 14)
(separate opinion of Judge Guillaume); Concerning the Arrest Warrant of April 11 2000 (Congo v. BeIg.),
2002 I.C.J. 1, 11 (Feb. 14) (separate opinions of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, & Buergenthal).
54. European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matter, ETS No. 073 (entered
into force Mar. 30, 1978); Morris, supra note 43, at 43-47; Ariel Zemach, Fairness and Moral Judgments in
International Criminal Law: The Settlement Provision in the Rome Statute, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 895,
907 (2003); Scheffer, supra note 45.
55. S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4572nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422 (2002); See
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of the Rome Statute establishes a jurisdictional regime that many states unequi-
vocally reject, thus, it is not a codification of customary jurisdictional principles.
c. Arkam is a Persistent Objector to the ICC's Jurisdictional Regime.
As often recognized by this Court,56 the persistent objector is a state that
constantly objects to a customary rule during its development, and is thus not
bound by it." In this case, Arkam has rejected the existence of the ICC since
its developing stages and thus neither signed nor ratified its Statute. Therefore,
arguments suggesting that the Rome Statute has created instant customary law
must be dismissed, since Arkam is unquestionably a persistent objector. Hence,
Randolfia's surrendering of Joseph Curwen to ICC jurisdiction would violate
the VCLT and customary international law.
3. Given the Ongoing Investigation by the Arkamian TRC into the Acts of
Mr. Curwen Described in the Indictment, the Exercise of Jurisdiction over
him by the ICC Would Violate the Principle of Complementarity.
The principle of Complementarity-the governing principle upon which
the operation of the ICC is based- 58 implies that in the presence of an
international and national criminal justice system, only if the former fails shall
the latter intervene. 9 Hence, ICC jurisdiction may not be invoked if a national
court with jurisdiction over a certain matter is willing and able genuinely to
investigate or prosecute.6" In this case, there is a state with jurisdiction which
is able and willing to investigate the matter of Curwen's alleged crimes.
Consequently, the ICC should not exercise jurisdiction over him.
generally U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4803rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1497 (2003).
56. Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131 (Dec. 18); North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. &
Den. v. Ger. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 26-27 (Feb. 20); Columbian-Peruvian Asylum Case, 1950 I.C.J. at 277-
78 (Nov. 20).
57. Ted L. Stein, The Approach of a Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector
in International Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 457 (1985); CASSESE, supra note 39, at 123-24; LAN BROWNLEE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (5th ed. 2002) (1998).
58. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, pmbl. & art. I, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.183/9
(2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]; El Zeidy, supra note 37, at 870.
59. El Zeidy, supra note 37, at 870.
60. Johan D. van der Vyver, Personal and Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1, 66 (2000); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 67 (2001); Llewellyn, supra note 37, at 194.
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a. Arkam has Jurisdiction over Curwen.
Generally, adjudicatory jurisdiction-the jurisdiction to subject persons to
the process of the courts of a state- 61 is based on territoriality or nationality.62
Under the nationality principle, a state may exercise jurisdiction over its
nationals wherever they may be and in respect of offences committed abroad.63
In this case, although Curwen has allegedly committed a crime in Leng, said
state, which would have jurisdiction under the territoriality principle, has chosen
not to intervene in Curwen's prosecution. Therefore, Arkam, Curwen's national
state, has uncontested jurisdiction over Curwen and his conduct.
b. Arkam is Carrying out a Genuine Investigation.
Under the Rome Statute, a case shall be inadmissible if a state with juris-
diction over said case is carrying out or has carried out an investigation or
prosecution, unless said state is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the
investigation or prosecution.64 The use of the conjunction "or" in this rule
reflects that the primacy of national process is preserved through either
investigation or prosecution, hence an investigation, regardless of its nature,
suffices.65
As has been done in numerous previous cases,66 Arkam has created a TRC
to investigate crimes committed during and in furtherance of the ethnic conflict.
Indeed, following Argentina's example, at least twenty-five states have imple-
mented TRCs to facilitate transitions to a public order of human dignity.67
States such as Chile, Argentina, South Africa, and Guatemala have created
panels to investigate human rights abuses of prior regimes or resolve civil
61. SCHACHTER, supra note 39, at 255; OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW at 462 § 138; WALLACE,
supra note 42, at 114; SCHABAS, supra note 60, at 59.
62. STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 161 (2ded. 2001); Strapatsas, supra note 47, at 1; SCHACHTER, supra note 39, at 255.
63. BROWNLIE, supra note 57, at 306; WALLACE, supra note 42, at 114; OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW at 462 § 138; CASSESE, supra note 39, at 288.
64. Rome Statute, supra note 58, art. 17(1).
65. Llewellyn, supra note 37, at 203.
66. Gregory Jowdy, Truth Commission in El Salvador and Guatemala: A Proposal for Truth in
Guatemala, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 285,300 (1997); Truth Commissions Digital Collection, United States
Institute of Peace, http://www.usip.org/library/truth.html; See Alan Lax, A Culture of reconciliation in Africa:
Transformative Justice, the Restoration of Dignity and Reconciliation, http://www.jiia.or.jp/pdf/lax.pdf.
67. Mark Vasallo, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: General Considerations and a Critical
Comparison of the Commissions of Chile and El Salvador, 33 MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 153, 156 (2002);
Dugard, Possible Conflicts ofJurisdiction with Truth Commissions, in I CASSESE ET AL, THE STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 694 (Oxford, 2002); Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew
Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World
Public Order of Human Dignity, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 316, 330-31 (1999).
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conflict emerged from political agreements.68 The validity of these TRCs as
investigative bodies has been supported by the United Nations. In El Salvador,
a TRC was appointed and administered by the United Nations to investigate the
abuses of a twelve-year civil war.6 9 Another example of a successful TRC is
South Africa's TRC, a unique United Nations supported and Non-Government
Organization (NGO) praised tripartite institution with powers to prepare a
record of the apartheid era, recommend reparations, and grant amnesty on the
basis of individual application.70 Arkam's TRC is modeled after South Africa's,
hence it constitutes a genuine form of investigation established to perform as a
psychological balm for victims of human rights violations and their families,"
and in the interest of the legitimate goals of peace and national healing,72 which
the Court should not mistake for unwillingness.
c. The Granting ofAmnesty should not be Regarded as
Unwillingness to Prosecute.
Unwillingness to prosecute exists when proceedings are undertaken for the
purpose of shielding the accused from criminal responsibility.73 However,
TRCs do not fit this description, since they are deemed alternative forms of
justice.74 Moreover, the granting of amnesty within the context of a recognized
TRC has been accepted as a form of achieving peacekeeping, nation-building
and reconciliation. 75  Although some question the validity of amnesties, as
international law stands today, a general duty to prosecute international crimes
is not supported by state practice.76 In fact, modem history is replete with cases
68. See generally Heather S. McHugh, The Truth About Truth Commissions (1996),
http://www.dec.org/pdf.docs/pnabyl77.pdf; Priscilla Hayner, Truth Commissions: Exhuming the Past,
NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS, Vol. 32 Issue 2, Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 30, available at
http://www.bard.edu/hrp/Hayner.htm; AMERICAS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE "POLITICS OF
AGREEMENT": CHILE DURING PRESIDENT AYLwIN'S FIRST YEAR (1991); Albie Sachs, Truth and
Reconciliation, 52 SMU L. REV. 1563 (1999).
69. Hayner, supra note 68, at 30-32.
70. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TRUTH AND JUSTICE: UNFINISHED
BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA 1 (2003) http//:www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/truthandjustice.htm.
71. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 62, at 229-38; El Zeidy, supra note 37, at 943.
72. SCHABAS, supra note 60, at 69.
73. Rome Statute, supra note 58, art. 17(2).
74. El Zeidy, supra note 37, at 943; Klosterman, supra note 37, at 840; Llewellyn, supra note 37,
at 198.
75. Gwen K. Young, Amnesty and Accountability, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 427, 434 (2002); Emily
W. Schabacker, Reconciliation or Justice and Ashes: Amnesty Commissions and the Duty to Punish Human
Rights Offences, 12 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1 (1999).
76. Dugard, supra note 67, at 698; Ronald C. Slye, The Legitimacy ofAmnesties under International
Law and General Principles ofAnglo-American Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty Possible?, 48 VA. L. REV. 174,
182-83 (2002).
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where amnesty has been granted for serious international crimes,77 such as in
Guatemala, Uruguay, Cambodia, El Salvador, South Africa, Haiti, and more
recently Colombia.78 Furthermore, the United Nations encouraged and helped
negotiate amnesties in several cases as a means of restoring peace.7 9 Accord-
ingly, the granting of amnesty to Curwen and other individuals in the context
of the Arkamian TRC constitutes a valid alternative form of justice and should
not be regarded as unwillingness to prosecute on the part of Arkam.
Finally, Randolfia may argue that an amnesty would shield Curwen from
punishment. However, punishment can take many non-criminal forms, includ-
ing removal from office and reduction of ranks.80 In this case, Curwen was
ordered to resign his commission without benefits. Hence, even the TRC's
amnesty would not shield him from punishment. Consequently, the Arkamian
TRC is a valid and effective assertion ofjurisdiction over Curwen that precludes
the complementary intervention of the ICC.
B. It Would be Illegal under International law for Randolfia to Surrender
Herbert West to the ICC Pursuant to the Warrant for his Arrest.
West has been charged with incitement to genocide under Article 25(3)(e)
of the Rome Statute and attempted genocide under Articles 6(a) and 25(3)(f).
Such charges are based on Article 28 (responsibility of superiors), and Article
25(3)(b) (responsibility for ordering, soliciting or inducing). Noting that under
Article 28 responsibility only derives from omissions," Arkam will refer to
West's conduct, rather than merely his actions or acts, to establish that the facts
do not support aprimafacie case, i.e. evidence amounting to an overwhelming
body of proof of potential guilt82 of his criminal responsibility for said charges.
77. PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS, CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND ATROCITY
app. 1(2001); Dugard, supra note 67, at 694; CASSESE, supra note 39, at 302.
78. Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnestyfor Peace: Was there a Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
in Haiti?, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 15-16 (1996); Naomi Rhot-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and
Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 449,458-61 (1990); Roman
Boed, The Effect of a Domestic Amnesty on the Ability of Foreign States to Prosecute Alleged Perpetrators
of Serious Human Rights Violations, 33 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 297,298 (2000); Col. Decree 128, Decreto sobre
Reincorporaci6n a la Vida Civil, 2003, art. 11(5).
79. Dugard, supra note 67, at 694; Scharf, supra note 78, at 5-7.
80. Scharf, supra note 78, at 18; Velisquez Rodriguez Case, I/ACt.HR, Series C, No. 4, 29 Jul.
1988; See generally Gary Hermositla et al v. Chile, Case 10.843, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 36/96, OEA/Ser.IV/H.95,
doc. 7 rev. 156 (1997).
81. Prosecutorv. Delalic etal, 1998 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-96-21-Tj 333 (Nov. 16); Prosecutor v. Blaskic,
2000 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-94-14-T 339 (Mar. 3).
82. MUELLER & BESHAROV, Evolution and Enforcement of International Criminal Law; 1 M.
CHEREJ BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 278 (2d ed. 1999).
2004]
236 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 11:217
1. Neither West nor his Allegedly Criminal Conduct Demonstrate The
Necessary Nexus with a State party to the Rome Statute.
The ICC may exercise its jurisdiction if the crime is committed in the
territory of a state party to the Rome Statute, or the perpetrator is a national of
a state party to said Statute.83 Randolfia will argue that the ICC has jurisdiction
since West's alleged crime took place in Leng, a party to the Rome Statute.
However, as proven below, should West's conduct be considered as criminal,
it occurred in Arkam, excluding the ICC's jurisdiction.
a. West's Alleged Crime of Incitement to Genocide was
Committed in Arkam.
Under the principle of territoriality, a crime is deemed to have been
committed in the territory of the state where it is consummated." West's
alleged responsibility must be established by determining the territoriality of his
conduct, such as where the conduct took place,85 noting that the conduct under
analysis is the recording of a tape and its delivery to a neighbor. This is done
by adopting the reasoning of the Quebec Superior Court in United States v.
Novick. In that case the Court restricted the territoriality of the crime to the
place where the act was executed. In United States v. Novak the crime was mail
fraud. The Court reasoned that the crime took place where the letter was
posted.86 As with mail fraud, incitement to commit genocide is an inchoate
crime,87 meaning that the act alone is punishable,88 irrespective of its results. 89
83. Rome Statute, supra note 58, art. 12(2).
84. Osakeyhti6 v. Commission (In re Wood Pulp Cartel), 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 96 I.L.R. 148, 174
19 (1988); Christopher C. Joyner, Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War
Criminals to Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 164 (1996); Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction
in International Law, in JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (Michael Reisman ed., 1999); ANTOLISEI,
MANUAL DE DERECHO PENAL PARTE GENERAL, Utcha Argentina, 105.
85. METZGER, TRATADO DE DERECHO PENAL 331-32, Madrid, (1955).
86. U.S. v. Novick, 1960 CarswellQue 6 61 (Quebec Sup. Ct. 1960).
87. Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, 2000 I.C.T.R. No. ICTR-97-32-I 16; Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, 2003
I.C.T.R. No. ICTR-98-44A-T 855; Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, 2003 I.C.T.R. No. ICTR-96-14-T 431;
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, 2003 I.C.T.R. No. ICTR-99-52-T 1013; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 1998 I.C.T.R. No.
ICTR-96-4-T 562; William A. Schabas, Hate Speech in Rwanda: The Road to Genocide, 46 MCGILL L.J.
141, 149 (2000); Joshua Wallenstein, Punishing Words: an Analysis of the Necessity of the Element of
Causation in Prosecutions for Incitement to Genocide, 54 STAN. L. REV. 351, 388 (2001).
88. Fillipo Grispigni, L Evento Come Elemento Costitutivo del Reato, in 3 ANNALI DI DIRITrO E
PROCEDURA PENALE 858 (1934); 1 MAGGIORE, DERECHO PENAL, TEMIS 294 (2d ed. 1982); Soler, Derecho
Penal Argentino, Vol. 1, 2nd ed., Tipogrfica Editora Argentina, 1953, 279; David L. Nersessian, The
Contours of Genocidal Intent: Troubling Jurisprudence from the International Criminal Tribunals, 37 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 231, 256 (2002).
89. Pierre Spitrri, L Infraction Formelle, in REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROIT PtNAL
COMPAR 497 (1966); Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: the Politics and
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Such crimes are consummated instantaneously when the criminal conduct is
performed.9" Additionally, criminal responsibility is individual9' and a person
can only be liable for conducts performed voluntarily.92 Thus, West will only
be responsible for conduct in which he voluntarily engaged, even though the
crime might have been committed in Leng, since conduct in Leng was
performed by others, as proven in Section C. Notwithstanding, Randolfia may
argue that the locus commissi delicti must be determined according to the result
theory. The result theory considers the crime as committed where its result
takes place (Leng). 93 Since an incitement is an inchoate crime, it is not subject
to this doctrine. Accordingly, Randolfia may try to further argue that, under the
effects doctrine the crime was consummated in Leng. The effects theory deter-
mines the territoriality of crimes by the place where their effects occur.94 How-
ever, this doctrine is highly controversial. It implies the extraterritorial
application of the law, 95 which is not contemplated in the Rome Statute.
Finally, Randolfia may argue that incitement is a continuous crime, perpe-
tuated in time and space into Leng. Such assertion is incorrect, since a
continuous crime only exists when all of its elements are present throughout itsduration,96 while incitement, as indicated above, is consummated instantan-
eously. Consequently, West's conduct was performed entirely in Arkam, repre-
senting no nexus with a state party to the Rome Statute.
Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 501, 506 (1996); Schabas, Principios Generales del Derecho
Penal, in EL ESTATUTO DE ROMA DE LA CORTE PENAL INTERNACIONAL 290 (Ambos & Guerrero eds.,
Universidad Extemado de Colombia, 1999).
90. ARTEAGA, DERECHO PENAL VENEZOLANO 135 (McGraw Hill 9th ed. 2001); SOSA, TEORIA
GENERAL DE LA LEY PENAL 248 (Ediciones Liber 2d ed. 2000); Maggiore, supra note 88, 295.
91. 91. Prosecutor v. Tadic, 1999 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-94-l -A 186 (July 15); Prosecutor v. Kordic &
Cerkez, 2001 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-95-14/2-T 364 (Feb. 26).
92. Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility, in 1 CASSESE ET AL, THE STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONALCRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 774 (Oxford, 2002); ANTONiOCASSESE, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 137 (2003); Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation
of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REv. 323, 330 (1985).
93. SOSA, TEORiA GENERAL DE LA LEY PENAL 282-83 (2000); ARTEAGA, DERECHO PENAL
VENEZOLANO 87-88 (2001).
94. PAUST ET AL, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 125 (Carolina Academic Press, 1996); CASSESE,
supra note 92, at 280; SCHABAS, supra note 60, at 63.
95. SHAW, supra note 39, at 423; BROWNLIE, supra note 57, at 310; OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL
LAW at 472 §136.
96. Regina v. Treacy, 55 I.L.R. 110, 116, (H.L. 1970); ARTEAGA, supra note 90, at 136; Jack
Balderson, Jr., Temporal Units of Prosecution and Continuous Acts: Judicial and Constitutional Limitations,
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b. West's Alleged Complicity was Perpetrated in Arkam
The conduct of the accomplice is subject to the jurisdiction of the state in
the territory of which it takes place.97 Should West be found responsible for
participating in the commission of incitement to genocide and genocide, only,
Arkam would have jurisdiction because West's conduct took place entirely in
Arkam, hence there would be no territorial nexus. Consequently, West's
conduct-whether considered as constituting an inchoate crime, or an act of
participation-was entirely executed in Arkam, which excludes ICC jurisdic-
tion, since the necessary nexus is not fulfilled.
2. West's Actions Preceded the Date on which the Rome Statute Entered
into Force with Respect to Leng and Randolfia and are Thus Barred from the
ICC's Consideration.
Under the principle of intertemporal law, when dealing with different legal
systems prevailing at successive periods of time, a "jurisdictional fact must be
appreciated in light of the law contemporary."9 This principle is embraced by
the Rome Statute. The Rome Statute provides that no one shall be criminally
responsible for conduct prior to its entry into force.99 Accordingly, even if
West's acts of recording a tape and delivering it to his neighbor were considered
crimes within the competence of the ICC, such acts, which took place April
2003, are not contemporary with the jurisdiction ratione temporis of the ICC.
This statute was entered into force for Leng and Randolfia on May 1 2003;
therefore, a breach of international law would occur if Randolfia surrendered
West to the ICC.
3. West's Alleged Acts do not Constitute a Crime of the
Competence of the ICC.
In order to justify West's surrender to the ICC under international law,
Randolfia must establish that there is a prima facie case of West's respon-
sibility. However, the evidence does not support the construction of a prima
facie case against West. An analysis of his actions in relation to the killings in
Leng does not prove his guilt beyond the reasonable doubt required by inter-
national tribunals.' 00
97. 3 JIMENEZ DE ASUA, TRATADO DE DERECHO PENAL 846-47 (3d ed., Losada, 1964).
98. R.Y. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 28-31 (1963). See also
Islands ofPalmas, Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott); Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17);
T.O. Elias, The Doctrine of Intertemporal Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 285, 286 (1980).
99. Rome Statute, supra note 58, art. 11.
100. Rome Statute, supra note 58, art. 66(3); ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, UN Doc fT/32,
2002, Rule 87(a); S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); S.C. Res.
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a. West is not Responsible for the Crime of Incitement to Commit Genocide.
As stated above, West has been charged with incitement to genocide and
attempted genocide. These charges are based on two forms of participation:
responsibility of superiors and participation by order, solicitation, or induction.
Although Arkam will not rebut the commission of the crime of incitement to
commit genocide, it is submitted that West cannot be held responsible for said
crime under either form of participation, as proven below.
i. West cannot be held responsible under the doctrine of superior
responsibility.
The superior responsibility doctrine requires proof of three elements: 1)
a superior-subordinate relationship; 2) knowledge by the superior of his
subordinates' actions; and, 3) failure by the superior to exercise due control over
his subordinates or inform of their illegal actions.' However, at least two of
these elements are not fulfilled.
A superior-subordinate relationship implies that the perpetrator of the
underlying offence is under a superior's effective control and authority,' which
entails that the latter be in position-political or military-to order the
commission of a crime or punish the perpetrators thereof.0 3 However, mere
leadership does not imply that a person has such authority or can exercise
effective control and authority over others." 4 Moreover, in the specific case of
non-military leadership, the civilian superior's degree of control must be similar
to that of a military commander,' 5 and the "material ability" to intervene to
prevent or punish offences is required. 6 In the Musema case, the ICTR set
955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg. at Art. 18(1), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994); Delalic, 1998 I.C.T.Y.
601.
101. Kajelieli, 2003 I.C.T.R. 1773; Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, 1999 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-95-12/1-T 69
(June 25); Prosecutor v. Galic, 2003 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-98-29-T 173 (Dec. 5); Greg R. Vetter, Command
Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the International Criminal Court (ICC), 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 89,
97-98 (2000); UNSC, Letterfrom the UNSG to the President of the SC, U.N. Doc. S/1994/673, at 16-17 (May
24, 1994).
102. Cecile Aptel & Jamie A. Williamson, Commentary on the Musema Judgment Rendered by the
United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, A Casenote, I MELB. J. INT'L L. 131, 140-41
(2000); Prosecutor v. Musema, 2000 I.C.T.R. No. ICTR-96-13-A 141; Delalic, 1998 I.C.T.Y. 646;
Kajelijeli, 2003 I.C.T.R. 773.
103. Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, 2001 I.C.T.R. No. ICTR-95-1A-T 61; Musema, 2000 I.C.T.R.
137; Delalic, 1998 I.C.T.Y. 378; Kajelyeli, 2003 I.C.T.R. 774.
104. Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, 2003 I.C.T.R. No. ICTR-96-1 0 & ICTR-96-1 7-T 182 ; Niyitegeka,
2003 I.C.T.R. 474-76; Prosecutor v. Semanza, 2003 I.C.T.R. No. ICTR-97-20-T 1415.
105. Bagilishema, 2001 I.C.T.R. 43; Delalic, 1998 I.C.T.Y. 378; Vetter, supra note 101, at 117.
106. Blaskic, 2000 I.C.T.Y. 302; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, 2001 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-
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certain parameters to the Doctrine of Superior Responsibility applied to
civilians, finding that Musema, as director of the Gisovu Tea Factory, had "legal
and financial control over [his] employees, particularly through his power to
appoint and remove these employees from their positions in the tea factory,' 0 7
and used his authority and power to order his employees to kill Tutsis in the
surrounding communities. The ICTR used these facts to determine that
Musema had the "material ability" to order crimes as well to prevent them. In
this case, West's abilities and competencies are not sufficiently demonstrated
to establish that he had such a control over GALA members. Indeed, the facts
show that West's leadership was more ideological than military. Consequently,
he cannot be deemed guilty under the superior responsibility doctrine.
In order to be held responsible for the actions of subordinates, the superior
must also know or disregard information indicating that the subordinates are
committing or about to commit a crime. 1 8 Knowledge implies awareness that
a circumstance exists or that a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of
events.' 9 Further, although it can be established through circumstantial
evidence, knowledge cannot be presumed."0 In this case, nothing evidences
that West had actual knowledge of the actions of other GALA members, and the
recording of the tape and subsequent delivery to his neighbor do not prove that,
in the normal course of events, it would have been broadcast through Radio
Yugott, much less incited Arkamians to conduct killing raids. Consequently,
West cannot be said to have known that such criminal actions would be
committed. Hence he is not guilty under the superior responsibility doctrine.
ii. West was not an accomplice of the GALA members who incited genocide.
International Tribunals have considered instigation as a form of consum-
mating the actus reus of complicity."' Instigation is defined as the prompting
of a person to commit an offence." 2 Ordering, soliciting, and inducing are
23/1-T 1 396 (Feb. 22); Prosecutor v. Naletilic & Martinovic, 2003 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-98-34-T 76 (Mar. 31);
Galic, 2003 I.C.T.Y. 176; Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, 1999 I.C.T.R. No. ICTR-95-1-T 511;
Delalic, 1998 I.C.T.Y. 395.
107. Musema, 2000 I.C.T.R. 880.
108. Rome Statute, supra note 58, art. 28(b)(i); Delalic, 1998 I.C.T.Y. 383; Michal Stryszak,
Command Responsibility: How Much Should a Commander be Expected to Know?, 11 U.S. A.F. ACAD. J.
LEGAL STUD. 27, 61-63 (2002); Mirjan Damaska, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49 AM. J.
COMP. L. 455, 462 (2001); Richard May & Steven Powles, Command Responsibility - A New Basis of
Criminal Liability in English Law, CRIM. L. R. 363, 371-72 (2002).
109. Rome Statute, supra note 58, art. 30(3).
110. Blaskic, 2000 I.C.T.Y. 307; Delalic, 1998 I.C.T.Y. 387.
111. Bagilishema,2001I.C.T.R. 70;Akayesu,1998I.C.T.R. 533-37;Kajelijeli,2003.C.T.R.9
762; Semanza, 2003 I.C.T.R. 381; Bagilishema, 2001 I.C.T.R. 30; Akayesu, 1998 I.C.T.R. 1 482.
112. Bagilishema, 2001 I.C.T.R. 170; Akayesu, 1998 1.C.T.R. 533-37.
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forms of instigation." 3 When a person orders, solicits or induces the commis-
sion of a crime that is in fact perpetrated or attempted,1 4 he is an accomplice to
such crime. However, ordering implies a superior-subordinate relationship," 5
and, as established above, there is no evidence of such relationship. Soliciting
or inducing also implies commanding, authorizing, urging or affecting, causing
or influencing a course of conduct by persuasion or reasoning. " 6 There is also
no evidence that West engaged in such conduct. Indeed, the ICTR in its
Kayishema and Ruzindanda decision, found instigating conduct in the promises
of money or food, giving weapons to the perpetrators, taking them to the places
where they would commit the crimes, or being physically present while the
crimes were committed." 7 There is no evidence whatsoever that West ordered
or otherwise caused by means of persuasion or reasoning the subsequent
conduct of GALA members. Hence, West cannot be held responsible as an
accomplice to such a crime.
Additionally, the accomplice's conduct entails individual criminal respon-
sibility only when it presents a direct causal link to a crime which is indeed
perpetrated or attempted."' Indeed, under the principle of novus actus
interveniens, in a sequence of a person's action, the intervention of another bars
the causal responsibility of the first person."9 In this case, the existence of a
causal link between West's actions and those of the broadcasters of the tape is
highly questionable, given the intervention of other GALA members in the
sequence of events (copying, distributing, and broadcasting) and the lack of
evidence of West's actual instructions. Therefore, West is not an accomplice
to incitement to genocide.
b. West is not Responsible for Genocide nor Attempted Genocide.
Randolfia may try to use the ICTR's Nahimana decision to argue that there
is a primafacie case of West's responsibility. In said case, the Trial Chamber
113. Eser, supra note 92, at 796; Kai Ambos, Article 25, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 480 (Otto Triffierer ed., Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-
Baden, 1999).
114. Rome Statute, supra note 58, Art. 25(3)(b).
115. Akayesu, 1998 I.C.T.R. 1 483; Blaskic, 2000 I.C.T.Y. 281; Naletilic, 2003 I.C.T.Y. 61.
116. Eser, supra note 92, at 796.
117. Kayishema & Ruzindana, 1999 I.C.T.R. 1 419, 421, 463.
118. ENRIQUEGIMBERNAT, AUTORYCOMPLICEENDERECHOPENAL 168-74(1966); Mufioz, Teoria
General del Delito, EDITORIAL TEMIS, 1990, at 207-09.
119. Kadish, supra note 92, at 334-36; Alan Brudner, Owning Outcomes: On Intervening Causes,
Thin Skulls, and Fault-Undifferentiated Crimes, 11 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 89, 91-93 (1998); Mark F. Grady,
Proximate Cause Decoded, 50 UCLA L. REV. 293, 335 (2002); Michael S. Moore, The Morality of Criminal
Law: A Symposium in Honor of Professor Sandy Kadish: The Metaphysics of Causal Intervention, 88 CAL.
L. REv. 827, 827-29 (2000).
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evaluated a series of contextual factors that presented a strong case against
Nahimana and Barayagwiza. The first factor was based on their role as
directors of Radio Television de Miles Colines (RTLM) and the Coalition pour
la Defence de la Republic (CDR), a radio station and a political party with
militias. They set course over the purposes and actions of those organizations.
The second factor found was that they exercised de facto control over RTLM
and the CDR. Finally, their organizations were aimed at creating ethnic vio-
lence and hatred. 2 Unlike the Nahimana case, it is not sufficiently clear
whether West was in a position to set course over its member's purposes or
actions. In fact, there is no evidence that West exercised authority or control
over GALA members or Radio Yuggott. Moreover, GALA's purpose is the
secession of Yuggott from Leng to create a "Greater Arkam," not the generation
of ethnic hatred or violence. The facts that were crucial to determine respon-
sibility in Nahimana cannot be proven in this case, especially since the evidence
provided here derives from local press, which has little evidentiary value in
criminal law. 2' Consequently, a prima facie case of West's responsibility
cannot be elaborated on that basis.
VI. REMEDIES SOUGHT BY ARKAM
States are liable for the wrongful acts attributable to them in violation of
international law.'22 Indeed, violations of international obligations give rise to
state responsibility and to the state's correlative duty of reparation,'23 which
must reestablish the situation to the conditions that would have existed if the
wrongful act had not been committed.'24 In this case, Randolfia intends to
surrender two Arkamian citizens to the jurisdiction of the ICC, wrongfully
intervening in Arkam's internal affairs and abrogating its right to exercise
jurisdiction over its nationals. Declaratory judgements provide satisfaction for
certain breaches of international obligations. 125 This Court and its predecessor
have willingly granted declarations as a form of satisfaction. 26 Accordingly,
120. Nahimana, 2003 .C.T.R. 949, 951, 972.
121. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 62, at 256.
122. Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts in Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of Its 53rd Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43,
UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States]; Spanish Zone of Morocco
Claims, (U.K. v. Spain), 2 RIAA, 615,2 ILR, 1928, 157; Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J.
9 (July 6).
123. Draf Articleso n the Responsibility ofStates, supra note 122, art. 3 1 (1); Polish Agrarian Reform
(Ger. v. Pol.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 45, 296 (July 29); Reparations Case, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 184 (Apr. 11).
124. Chorzrw Factory, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at 29 (Sept. 13).
125. 2 SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE, THE LAw AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 584 (1986).
126. Concerning the Aerial Incident of July 27, 1955 (lsr. v. Bulg.), 1959 I.C.J. 127 (May 26);
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based on all that has been sufficiently proven above, Arkam requests this Court
declare that it would be illegal for Randolfia to surrender Joseph Curwen and
Dr. Herbert West to the ICC pursuant to the warrants for their arrest.
VII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Based on the foregoing reasons, Arkam respectfully requests that this Court
DECLARE that it would be illegal under international law for Randolfia to
surrender Joseph Curwen to the ICC pursuant to the warrant for his arrest; and
DECLARE that it would be illegal for Randolfia to surrender Herbert West to
the ICC pursuant to the warrant for his arrest.
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